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The Duration of Youth Unemployment in West Germany:
Some Theoretical Considerations
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical model dealing with the
duration of youth unemployment in West Germany. Duration can be
expressed in terms of the underlying hazard function. After a
brief discussion of a reasonable shape of the hazard function a
distinction is made with respect to the probabilities of receiving
a job offer and accepting it. Determinants of the latter decision
are developed using a unified model of consumption, leisure, and
job search. Uncertainty and some restrictions such as standard
work time and entitlement to unemployment compensation are taken
into account. The probability of receiving a job offer depends,





West GermanyThese are the unhappy persons
who, in the great lottery of
life, have drawn a blank.
Thomas Robert Maithus (1798)
I. Introduction and caveats
The duration of unemployment is one of the most important factors
of unemployment experience besides the risk of becomingunemployed and
the number of spells of unemployment. A study of youthunemployment in
Germany, therefore, has to carefully examine the determinants of the
duration of youth joblessness. Previous work has shown [W.Franz(1979)]
that the average duration of youth unemployment isconsiderably shorter
than that of adult unemployment. The probability of becomingunemployed,
however, is much higher for the youths than for adults. This is not to
say that youths do not suffer much from unemployment due to the short
duration. At least the number of spells in a given time period,say one
year, has to be taken into account in order to compare adequately.
Given that whether to be unemployed or not may be(still) a lottery
as Thomas R. lthus has pointed out, are there biases in the sampling
scheme with respect to specific individual characteristics —sayeducation,
work experience, age, or sex, for example?
The present paper which is a part of a larger study on youthunemploy-
ment tries to outline a theoretical basis for the empirical investigation
of the causes of youth unemployment. The empirical part will use German micro
data of unemployed persons leaving the unemployment register withina given
sample week(September,1976). Although the theory discussed in thispaper
exceeds the framework of the empirical approach, it does not take into—2—
account several important aspects of the duration of youth unemployment
due to the limitations of the data. Most important, the general level of
aggregate demand for labor is given and only differences of this level
with respect to regions, industries etc. can be taken into account partly.
It might, therefore, be helpful to label this study by: warning —aggregate
demand is given.
II. Theory
In this section a theoretical framework explaining the duration of
youth unemployment is developed. A theory of unemployment has to take
into account both supply and demand factors.' One possible recent approach
is to discuss the individual's time allocation decision on the basis of a
unified model of consumption, labor supply, and job search such as the
sophisticated model of J.J. Seater (1979, 1977), for example, which partly
contains most of the earlier micro foundation models as special cases.
One disadvantage of the Seater model, however, is the ignorance of
any demand factor since it is assumed that the individual can make a work—
no work decision each time period regardless of whether there is a job offer
or not. Besides this, there is no uncertainty and no unemployment insurance
introduced in this model and the sense of job search during the last job of
working life is not quite obvious. Assets are introduced but the individual
does not derive utility from asset holding. With respect to youth unemploy-
ment there is some doubt if youths apply such a general life—time utility
maximization approach. The elegance of that approach may be at the expense
of describing reality.
In what follows we try to discuss the duration of youth unemployment
considering demand factors, unemployment insurance, and uncertainty more
explicitly. To begin with, the duration can be expressed in terms of the
hazard function.2 It is defined as the proportion of items failing in a time
period (x, x + dx) among those items which have survived up to the time x.—3—
In our study the hazard function is the proportion of unemployed who left
unemployment status in the sample week among all unemployed registered.
More precisely, the hazard function h(x) is defined as
(1) h(x) =F(x)/dx
where F(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function and where 1 —F(x)
can be interpreted as the sum of unemployed who "survived" in the unemployment
register until x. The function 1 —F(x)is the "reliability" of unemployment
and is characterized by the hazard function. Eq. (1) can be written as
(2)h(x) dx =d[— ln(l—F(x))].




andif we define F(x) =0we obtain
(4) fXh(x)dx=- ln(l-F(x)).
xo
Solving (4) for F(x) gives
(5) F(x) =l—exp{JXh()d}
xo
A distinguishing characteristic of each life—length model is the under-
lying hazard function. If we know the hazard function of the unemployed we
can calculate the respective duration of unemployment. Hence F(x) describes
the distribution of the duration of unemployment. Several hypotheses concerning
that distribution may be formulated depending on whether the hazard function
is constant or varying with duration.3 In order to allow flexibility assume
that h(x) is of the form
(6)h(x) =AxAlaA
fromwhich the following two parameter Weibull— distributionresults if the
truncation point x0 is zero.4
(7)F(x;a,A) =f (x;o,A) dx
x=
= l—exp{—()A}—4—
The flexibility of the Weibuil— distribution can be shown by reducing the
Weibull—variable X by the transformation Z =X/a.Hence
(8)h (z;x) =A
and h decreases (increases) with increasing z when A<i(A>l) and remains
constant for A=l (exponential model6). Employing eq.(6) we can specify the
hazard function by
(9) ln h (x;A) =i3Z (x)+(A—l)ln x-I-e• w 1J 1
whereZ..(x) is a vector of explanatory variables of the i—th individual in the
j—th spell of unemployment and x is the duration of that spell. The ct• represent
individual differences not captured by the Z—variabies. If we assume that
the explanatory variables do not vary within one spell and simplify notation,
eq. (9) reduces to
(10) in h(x)=Z.. + (A—i) in x +
Although the Weibull—distribution seems to be rather flexible at a first
glance, a major disadvantage of an approach using this distribution is the
sharp contrast between a rising and a falling hazard function corresponding
to the value of A.Suppose, for example, that an unemployed person does not
suffer so much in the first days of unemployment as later. Or suppose the
labor office needs some days to complete the unemployed person's records and
to propose a job, and another few days pass until the unemployed person starts
working. Both examples imply that the hazard function may rise to a peak in
the first days and then decrease with time. Opposite to pure reliability
application where it is difficult to rationalize such a shape7, it should
not be excluded a priori in the present study. A promising specification,
therefore, may rely on the log—normal distribution. The probability distri-
bution function and the cumulative distribution function of a log—normal random
variable are given by8
'I -I
(l0a)f (x; ).—----— 1 (———-'-—) in/ 2
(lOb)F1(x;,& ji J'()fxL. L
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wherex,cy>Oand ln stands for log—normal. Inserting equations (lOa) and(lob)-.5--
into equation (1) gives the hazard function of this distribution. It
can be shown that the hazard function increases to a maximum and then
decreases to zero as x -* Employing this type of a hazard function seems
to be more appealing than excluding a maximum value of the hazard function
a priori.
One should be careful, however, in deciding whether the individual
hazard function is constant or not. As has been shown,for example, by
S. Salant(1977) and T. Lancaster(l979) an observed falling hazard function
may be due to the effect of unrecognized heterogeneity of the individuals
in question. They may have in fact a constant hazard function but individuals
with high escape rates will tend to be ?Isorted out sooner and those
individuals with a poor performance will remain. Thus the average hazard
function may decline due to heterogeneity although the individual hazard
function may be constant over time.
After this brief discussion concerning the distribution of the duration
of unemployment the next step is to analyse the explanatory variables of
the hazard function. The probability of leaving the unemployment register
and being employed in a given time period can be viewed as the joint probability
of receiving at least one job offer (A) and of accepting one job off er(=B).
Hence this joint probability is
10
(11) p(AB) =p(BA)p(A)
The probability of receiving a job offer p(A) has to take into account both
general business conditions and individual specific characteristics of the
unemployed person seen by the employer. The conditional probability of
accepting a job offer represents the choice of the individual whether to work
or not, which depends onthe individual's preferences and his budget constraint.
Factors determining the decision whether a job offer is accepted by
the unemployed person or not are considered first. Although the above considera-
tions concerning the hazard function suggest a multiperiod framework of the decis-
ion process, we restrict ourselves to a two time period model (period t andt1)—6--
inorder to evaluate the effects more clearly. The folio wing considerations,
however, maybeextended to the life—time model without substantial change
to the results.
Consider an unemployed youth at the beginning of period t and suppose
he has got a job offer for t but he does not know if he will get one for
t + 1. The youth derives utility from consumption (C), measured in goods,
and leisure (F), measured in hours, whereas labor (L) and job search (S),
both measured in hours, cause disutility. Let T be the fixed time at the
individual's disposal,11 which he mayspendin L,S, and F with the restriction
that
(12)T=
LE+ST+ FT Tt,t + 1
The utility function is assumed to be constant over the two periods and
specified as
(13)U[(-t),F(r]U[C(T),L(T) + S(T)] T=t,t+1with u>O, UCC<O, UL+S<O,
UL+SL+SO. We assume that the utility function satisfies the usual
properties.12 The individual's two period budget constraint includes labor
income and unemployment compensation. For the sake of simplicity and taking
into account that the individual is a youth we neglect wealth considerations,
i.e. the initial and final value of assets equals zero. The youth may, however,
make a deficit or a surplus in the first period. With respect to a deficit
there may be credit restrictions for an unemployed youth which are neglected
her e.
The individual faces several requirements concerning the work time and
the entitlement to unemployment compensation. These restrictions may be
described by the following assumptions,
Assumption A: Consumption must be positive in both periods in Order to allow
for a minimum consumption. Since the youth is assumed to have
no wealth he must work in at least one time period. We can,
therefore, distinguish three cases.13
CaseI: Lt>O. Lt+10
Case II: L>O, Lt+1>O
Case III: LEO, Lt+i>OAll job offers require that the individual must work at least
some standard number of hours L. The individual is allowed
to work any amount over L within the time restriction given
by T (eq.12).
The individual receives unemployment compensation only if he
has worked before. Assume he is not or no longer entitled to
unemployment compensation in the first period, hence he gets
unemployment compensation only if Lt>0 or, recalling assumption
B, if Lt> IL. The amount of the unemployment compensation depends
on the previous income wtLt and the unemployment benefit ratio
for the second period 9 .Besidesthis, unemployment compen—
sation is of course not available for Lt÷i>0. Hence, the
individual may receive unemployment compensation only in case
I(Lt> L,L+i =0).
Case I.: Lt>t, Lt÷10, tlt+l>0
Case u L>L, 9+0
Case IIILt=0, Lt÷1>T, 9t+1°
Assumption D: Job search S makes sense only if the individual plans to work
in the second period. Clearly, this follows from our limitation
to a two period model. In a life—time model job search would also
not make sense if the last job of working life is held.
Hence, we obtain finally:
Case I: Lt>L, Lt+i=0, 9t÷i>°' s=o
Case II:L>L, Lt+l>L, q÷1=0, St>o
CaseIIILt=0, Lt+l>L, 9t+i=0' t>0
There maybe,however, some doubt if case III is a true chcicc for theindLidual
since there is no guarantee for a job offer in period t + 1. In order not to be
accused of letting the youth starve if he chooses Lt=o but unexpectedly does not
get a job offer, we redefine C as consumption exceeding the minimum consumption
and assume that the youth really does want to consume more in both periods and
therefore must plan to work in at least one period. Hence lim U= + now
C-C
with C the minimum consumption paid by the parents in both periods in any of
cases I to III. Alternatively we can assume that the youth will be on a very




The budget constraint is then given by
(14))((' L -p) r £il f14 L -C
' )r'r -r—
L t
￿ LCl r c C
L c
wherer is the market interest rate by which the individual may borrow or
lend and which is assumed to be constant(rt =r). is the highest wage offer
the individual has received until the beginning of period t.Its determinants
are discussed later. is the wage rate the individual expects to receive
in the future. It differs from his current wage in several ways. As
mentioned earlier, the unemployed person may be uncertain if he will get a
job offer at the beginning of the second period and how much of the current
wage he can achieve. Let be an additive stochastic disturbance term with
2
N(O,c)toformalize this uncertainty. It includes a zero wage offer if
is small enough to compensate all other factors determining the future
wage rate. Such other factors are expected business conditions B*t+1,
abilities A, and the search duration in period t. The search duration is not
assumed to be a necessary condition to get a job offer but is expected to have
a positive effect on both the probability of receiving a job offer and the
wage rate offered. There may be a negative effect if the search is carried
out while unemployed. The employer may view an unemployed searcher as an
applicant with less satisfactory potential performance. The unemployed searcher
himself may have a weaker position compared with an employed searcher due to
a higher readiness to make concessions. In order to take into account this
negative effect let D3 be a dummy being 1 for case III (unemployed in period t)
and zero otherwise. This dummy variable also takes into account the possibility
that in case II the job held in t may be the same which is held in t+l. Hence
we expect a higher probability to get a job offer in t+l if D3 equals zero
(case I and II).—9—
(15) w1 =cz1w
+g(D3,B1AS) + ut+1
D3 =1 if L=O
0 otherwise
The restriction concerning the minimum work time is met by introducing
a slack variable H>O with
(16)L —H =L or L =L + H Tt,t+l
TT T T
Thequestion is does the individual choose not to work in one period
and to become unemployed, and if he does so which period is the unemployment
period. We are especially interested in whether or not the individual, who
is assumed to be unemployed before period t, remains unemployed in t. The
objective of the individual is to maximize the expected value of utility
subject to the constraints.
In general the problem is given by












How does the individual make his decision? Note that he cannot
maximize expected utility of present consumption, labor, and job search
unless he knows the expected utility of the second period. The reason
is that he cannot be sure to get a job offer in the second period. Hence
the decision of the optimal values of the variables in the present
period is conditioned by whether he gets a job offer for the second
period or not. Remember, for example, that in order to receive a job
Offer some search time is useful (see equation 15). The maximal
utility of the second period is determined by the amount of C, L+i,
and w1 and therefore also of St because of the relationship between w+i
and S. Hence the decision for the first time period requires some
information concerning the decision of the second time period. If
the individual would reverse the decision process it might happc
that he would decide not to search (or only a little bit). But that might
imply no job offer which conversely implies work in the first period.
Hence the individual must solve his maximization problem in two steps
where the first step is to maximize expected utility of the second period.















The starting point is the decision whether to work in thesecond period or
not. This decision implies an expected utility of
U1 and U2, respectively.
Then the decision for the first time period is madetaking into account
the results for the second period. The resultingexpected utilities










The numbers I, II, III correspond to the threecases mentioned earlier.
To avoid possible confusion it should be mentionedagain that one
means the first step in the decision process which concerns the secondtime
period. The expected utility from working in the second periodEU1 is
discussed first. Recalling equation 15,w1 depends on several variables
including skills, business conditions, job search duration, and whether
the job searcher is unemployed or not. Let X bea vector including these
determinants and letw1 be the resulting wage rate which differs from
w1 because of uncertainty.
Suppose that the distribution ofw1 can be approximated by a contin-
uousdensity function f [w+1 andassume further that all wages below
a given level, say, are non—admissable job offers since the employer





The probability that the individual receives a job offer is then given
by
(18)
f[w(X)]dw w t-i-l t÷l
Both the negotiatedwage rate and the distribution are assumed to
be known to the individual. The uncertainty mentioned above is captured
by an additive disturbance term u1 N(0, y2). 1-lence
(19) w1 =wti(X)
+u1
and the joint density function is given by
(20)g[w41(X). u) > 0, where
(21) Pp g[÷1(X).ut÷i]dwt+1 du÷1=l
If we assume a bivariate normal distribution for w1 and u+1. with variances




1 t+l -Wt÷l)22 2pu(+1 - [ —+—----- ]
2(l-p)a 2 w a wu
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and where w1 denotes the mean of Using expression (22) we are
able to calculate the probability that the individual receives a job offer—13—
(i.e. w÷1 Thisimplies, however, that the individual is willing
to accept w41 <w1if the probability of a positive error provides that
w41 > Thatmeans, for example, that he may reduce his job search
duration to an amount which --ceterisparibus --wouldimply no job
offer (wt+i< wt+1). But since he views the influences captured by a
positive u÷1 as certain and strong enough,he nevertheless expects to
get a job offer, (i.e. a wage rate w1 > Inthe latter case, then
there would be no need to work in the first period. This, however, would
suggest more the behavior of a risk attraction. In the case of more
risk aversion we may employ the following approach. Assume a zero covari-
ance, for the sake of simplicity, and rewrite (22) as
(23) JE, (x)]
• d
Ifthe individual is more risk averse the probability of receiving
a job offermay be sufficient totheindividual if
(24)J (x)]f ) o1. J
o.s f 4{41(X)JrIt41
wt44
In this case both w and u must have passed threshold value until t+l t+l
the individual has a non-zero expectation of a job offer. Since the indi-
vidual must work in the second time period unless he works in the first
period, there is some reason to believe that he may act as a risk averter
in the sense mentioned above.'5







2 fJ R+1 (fl / f f1)]+.
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Although ratherrestrictive assumptions have been employed, thedescrip-
tion of the decision problem of the youth turns out to be rathercompli-
cated. We did not take into account other important features. Togive an
example, the individual does not correct his estimate ofw1 during the
first period. Once he has made his decision he does not revise it.
Including this would require an introduction of optimal stopping rules.
Besides the increase in mathematical complication of the system there is
some justification for not revising the decision if the periods are
not too long (a month, for example),16 and roughly coordinate with the
employer's interval of hiring (say the 1st of each month). Therefore
we do not proceed in analyzingthe stochastic nature of the futurewage rate,
but continue to derive the expected utilities according to the decision
flow diagram.
The utility from working in the second time period EU,1 is given
by
(26) EfE /Pt] (w I ti
&'t4
Thefirst expression is the benefit from working in the second period and
the second expression denotes the cost in terms of the (negative)marginal
disutility of labor. It can be seen that this expected utility isgreater—15—
the higher the marginal utilities of consumption and the lower the dis-
utilities of labor and job search. The duration of job search plays an
ambiguous role. It raises both the wage in t+l and the disutility in t.
The other explanatory factors and u+1have an unambiguous effect on EU1.
The better the business conditions, the more highly skilled the indivi-
dual is, and the higher the variance of u+i the more likely is a higher
value of Eli1 provided that the individual gets a job offer. However,
the more risk averse the individual is, the smaller will he perceive the
probability of a job offer; so there may be no realistic choice whether to
work in period t+l or not. He then may return to the starting point and
follow the decision flow diagram for Lt+1 =0and Lt >L.On the other
hand, if the probability of getting a job offer is certain enough, the
individual in a second step makes a choice whether to work in the first
time period or not. In each of these cases the expected utility is calcu-
lated by adding the (negative) expected disutility of labor to the
(positive) expected utility of consumption. Hence





Notethat in the case E U2 the individual does not derive utility from con-
sumptionfinanced bywork in the first period. As indicated by the flow diagram,
however,he may partly shift consumption financed by work in the second period
into the first period. The respective utility is included in E U1.
We must now consider unemployment compensation to which the individual
is entitled if he has worked in period t but does not work in t+l. The
exnected utility resulting from irnemn1ovmi-it comnristion -Ic thrfnr—16—
includedin
(30) E _)fp +
it-I
Bydeciding how much to work in the first period the individual therefore
has to take into account the benefit resulting from receiving unemployment
compensation.
I II III The values for EU ,EU ,andEU can be calculated, however,
only if the expected optimal values of labor, job search and consumption
are known These values can be obtained by differentiating the Lagrange-
function (17) with respect to the decision variables subject to the
budget constraint.
(31) E (14)P42(.)tl J
Thiscondition holds for all three cases and simply states the well-
known result that the ratio of expected future and present marginal
utilities of consumption equals the market discount factor provided that
the interest rate is known with certainty and the price level is con-
stant.
(32)%: E {{- ('+] o
This condition is valid for cases I and II with employment in the
first period. It is an inequality because of the constraint Lt L
and indicates that the individual may not be able to realize the utility
maximum of the unconstrained case. The difference between cases I and 111 is
the yalue of It is zero for case II since L÷i>L. In general this con-
dition states the relationship betweenthe expected marginal disutility
of present labor and the expected marginal utility—17—
offuture consumption. A higher current real wage rate and/or a higher
unemployment compensation imply higher future consumption and/or a





This condition holds with no difference for cases TI and III since job
search makes sense only if the unemployed plans to work in the second
period (assumption D). The higher the amount of planned labor supply
(below L) in t+l and the more profitable job search (i.e. the greater
the higher the duration of job search in period t.
•_fLu.) -




This inequality holds for cases II and III since in case I labor supply
is zero for period t+l. The derivation of (w+It+1) has been described
above. Note that D3 (whether the job searcher is unemployed or not) is
zero for case II and one for case III. The higher w+1/BD3 is, the less
successful is job search with respect to a higher wage rate the individual
expects to receive. Ceteris paribus, however, a higher duration of job
search in t means a higher wage rate in t+l, thus enabling the individual to
consume more and/or work less as condition (34) indicates. On the other
hand, the greater the uncertainty with respect to the likelihood of receiv-
ing a job offer, the smaller is the amount of these convenient effects.
If the uncertainty is great enough, the individual must switch from cases
II and III to case I.—18—
The effects of changes of exogenous variables depend on the
values of the parameters of the entire system. To give an illustration,
consider case II with labor supply in both periods and assume an increase
in the present wage rate. To begin with, condition (32) states that
this may lead to a lower current labor supply and/or to a higher future
consumption with the amount of both effects depending on the expected
marginal(dis-)utilities. Condition (31) states that present consumption
will increase, too. In order to satisfy condition (33) the decrease in
may cause an increase in the duration of job search since
the individual may have free time available from his diminished current
employment. The latter effect, however, depends on the planned future
labor supply. A higher duration of job search implies a higher future
wage rate, ceteris paribus, which has a contrary effect to the decrease
in the utility in future consumption due to higher future consumption
induced by the increase in the wage rate in the current period. The net
effect determines the sign and the amount of the change of future
labor supply, which again simultaneously influences the duration of
job search according to condition (33).
Although evaluating these effects may be instructive, we are
more interested in the question of whether or not the individual switches
from one case to another since we want to investigate the determinants
whether an unemployed person leaves the unemployment register or not. More
precisely, when does the individual switch from remaining unemployed
and working in the second period (case III) to the cases of accepting the
job offer and working being either employed or i-nemployed in the second
period? Given the values of the exogenous variables, the individual
calculates the expected utility for all three cases inserting the optimal
values of the endogenous variables into the utility function. Assume—19—
that the individual has chosen case III. He will swit￿h to, say, case I
I III.
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Themajor eects canheseen already withoutexplicitlysolving the
inequality. A switch to case I is theiore likely, ceteris paribus
(i) The higher the unemployment benefit ratio. At a first
glance this result may be contrary to the theoretical and empirical
discussion of this topic.17 Note, however, that the individual in
this model is not (or no longer) entitled to unemployment compensation
which does not seem to be completely unrealistic in the case of youth
unemployment.In order to be entitled to "enjoy" the high unemployment
compensation the individual must have worked previously.
18
Therefore,
this result is not necessarily contrary to the mentioned studies. What-
ever the relationship between unemployment and unemployment compensation,
what these theories have in mind is the work behavior of the second
period of this model.
(ii) The higher the present wage rate compared with the expected
future wage rate. Taking into account the determinants of the expected
future wage rate, the individual will be more likely to switch to work
in the first period the worse the expected business conditions, the
weaker the position of an unemployed searcher (compared with an employed
searcher), and the greater the uncertainty of getting a job offer at all.—20—
(iii) The higher the disutility of job search (i.e., thehigher
I U(.)/S) and the less the improvement of the futurewage rate due to
job search.
(iv) The lower the abilities of the individual.Higher abilities
measured by school education, vocationaltraining, and work experience
may lead the individual to the assumption that he will get a higher
wage rate in the future. That is to say, in terms of search models the
reservation wage increases with the level of abilities. Thisimplies
a higher duration of inemployment ceteris paribus whichmay be a rather
curious result and contradicting actual experience,at a first glance.
Note, however, that demand conditions which also relyupon the indivi-
dual's abilities have not been taken into accountyet.
(v) The less the individual suffers from workingnow than later.
That means the greater the disutility of labor in thesecond period
compared with the first period (i.e., the greater the difference
more likely is a switch to working in the
first period.
We want to stress, however, that there are interactions between
these effects and that these arguments are valid ceterisparibus only.
Some of the variables of the system are notobservable, of course. But
they may be influenced by individual characteristicsreported in the
records of the unemployed. The crucialstep is to link the unobserv-
able components of the theory with observed characteristicsof the indi-
vidual (i.e., in the present context to determinemainly how the (dis-)
utilities of the model may be influenced by observableindividual
characteristics such as health conditions, maritalstatus, etc.). The
fOllowing examples may illustrate. A high number of proposals forjobs—21—
made by the labor office and rejected by the applicant may indicate a
present weak work ethic, i.e.a high disutility of labor in the first
period in our model. The number of unemployment spells (relative to the
individualts age) may serve as a similar proxy. Temporary poor health
conditions may increase the present disutility of labor, too. Marital
status may affect the marginal utility of consumption since the same
level of consumption may have a higher marginal utility for a married
individual who is the bread-winner of the family. For a married indivi-
dual the model suggests a higher consumption implying a higher total
labor supply and thus a higher probability that the individual wants to
work in boih periods. It is unnecessary to say that one must be careful
in making general statements. In order to illustrate for the latter
example: the probability that a married woman, who is not the main
bread-winner of the family, accepts a job offer may be lower than that
of a single woman. The former may have a low'regional mobility due to
the employment conditions of her husband.
Recalling eq(ll), the question whether an individual leaves the
unemployment register depends on both the probability that the indivi-
dual receives at least one job offer and that he accepts one.'9 It
remains to discuss the first probability. Assume that there are vacan-
cies with different requirements concerning the qualifications of the
job.2° Assume for a moment that the job searcheror the firm contacted
each other, which is the more likely the more intensive and longer the
duration of search of both parties has been in the previous period. When
will the searcher get a job offer (including a wage offer)?
In order to make a decision the firm must determine the applicant's
productivity. A screening process is undertaken, therefore,which assigns—22--
each applicant with a score: failing or passing. The decision if an
applicant fails or passes depends on whether he satisfies a given mini-
mum requirement of ability. If no applicant passes the test the firm
continues to search.2' Applicants who fail do not get j.oboffers. But
on the other hand, not all applicants who pass will get job offers. The
first reason is that the firm does not hire overqualified workers for a
job with given skill requirements even if the applicant agrees upon a
rather low wage rate compared with his ability. At a first glance, this
may violate the standard assumption of a profit maximizing firm which
states that the firm hires those persons whose marginal product is
higher or equal their real wage rate. Note, however, that the marginal
product of an applicant with much more ability that required may be
lower than that of an applicant who meets the requirements. This may be
due to the dissatisfaction of his situation, for example, which may even
negatively influence the morale of the other employees.
Suppose the ability -whichis defined more precisely later -can
be measured by an index. Let f(A) be the distribution of ability of
all applicants known to the firm, Ad the firm's desired level of ability22,
A .theminimum level to be fulfilled in order to get a job offer, and A mm max
the maximum level beyond which the applicant is viewed to be overqua'ified.
p.—23--
The probability of being considered to get a job offer is thengiven by
A
p max
(36) H 1A f(x)dx
mm
Young workers may be allowed to have a greater variance of abilities
since (vocational) schooling is often the only information available to
the employer.
The sequence in which each of the applicants will get a job offer
C (combinedwith a wage offer) depends on the value of A-A with A—A,A —A d mm d max
The applicant with the highest (positive) value will receivea job offer
first. Since his abilities are higher than the requirements for thisjob,
the firm may offer him a higher wage rate compared with thewage rate
of the applicant with abilitiesAd. This depends on how much the firm
believes in an increase of productivity due to these higher abilities.
This leads to the general question to what extent measured abilities
are able to predict the productivity of the applicant.
There are different views on how much education determinesproductiv-
ity.
23
Productivity may depend only on the type of the job and not on
education (pure signalling model) or may be determined by education(pure
human capital model).
Assume that the level of abilities can be measured by an index in-
cluding school education, vocational training, and the result of an
interview. The fact that certain characteristics ("signals") attached
to the individual do not always tell the whole story about the indivi-
dual's productivity makes the hiring decision an investment decision
under uncertainty.24 "On the basis of previous experience in themarket,
the employer will have conditional probability assessmentsover produc-
tive capacity given various combinations0f signals and indices."25—24—
The expected marginal product for an individual with given observable
attributes then results in a wage offer (if A .<A<A ).Thefirm may mm— —max
increase the wage offer if the applicant does not accept it. The maximal
amount of this revision is reached when future marginal costs due to a
non-hiring of this applicant (search costs of the firm) equal the marginal
cost of the additional wage payment, ceteris paribus.26 It is this
final wage offer of the firm which was introduced in the individual's
unified model of consumption, leisure, and job search, and which has
been denoted by w earlier. Hence, this wage offer depends on the expected
productivity of the applicant Tr*andis conditional on the educational
level F (neglecting search duration for this moment).
(37) w =w(rrIEt).
The less the individual's abilities differ from the firm's desired
level of ability (Ad), the greater is the probability of getting a job
offer, ceteris paribus. As has been pointed out, a certain minimum
level of abilities is very important depending on the kind of job which
is in question.27 The crucial step, however, is to fit these considerations
in a manageable framework taking into account the limitations of the data.
Suppose therefore,that we can distinguish between n categories of jobs
with given requirements concerning skills. Assume that each individual
can be placed in one(and only one) of these categories according to his
personal abilities measured by school education. Each category of jobs
requires a minimum level of skills measured by the extemt of vocational
training (including higher vocational training schools) and work experi-
ence.28 Let DA be a variable which indicates to what extent the indivi-
dual meets the minimum requirements.29 The greater DA is, the higher—25—
the probability that the individual receives a job offer.
We want, however, to stress the simplicity of this procedure which
takes into account only a part of the theoretical considerations. The
upper limit of skills the firm allows for a certain job is disregarded
because data on vacancies distinguished by the level of requirements are
not available.30 We do know the number of the labor office's proposals
to the unemployed for presenting himself before firms that have announ-
ced vacancies in jobs that the labor office judges to be roughly appro-
priate to the unemployed person. Due to several deficiencies of this
variable3 it can serve only as a roughproxy for the proba-
bility of receiving a job offer.
Hence, the probability that the individual receives a job offer at the
beginning of period t is the higher
-thelonger and more intensive the search has been in previous
time periods,
-themore the individual meets the minimum requirements of skills
of the job category he is belonging to, and
-thehigher the number of the labor office's proposals to the
unemployed persons described above.—26—
III. Conclusion
The outcome of the theory may be summarized as follows.
(i) A distinguishing characteristic of the duration is the underlying
hazard function from the shape of which the length of a stay in
the unemployment register can be calculated. A log—normal dis-
tribution seems to be an appropriate specification.
(ii): Heterogeneity of the individuals can be taken into account by
analyzing both the probability of receiving at least one job offer
and the probability of accepting one job offer for each individual.
(iii) The decision of the individual whether to accept a job offer or
not can be analyzed in a unified model of consumption, labor supply,
and job search. Several restrictions concerning some minimum work
time, a minimum wage, and the entitlement to unemployment must be
considered. Besides this uncertainty with respect to future job
offers plays an important role. The greater uncertainty the more
likely is an acceptation of a job offer now. Search plays an
ambiguous role since it raises disutility and the probability of
receiving a better job offer. The effect ofthe amount of unem-
ployment compensation is ambiguous, too, and depends on whether
the individual is entitled to it or not in the present time period.
Higher abilities of the individual may result in a higher reservation
wage such implying a longer duration of job search ceteris paribus.
(iv) The probability of receiving a job offer depends on the screening
process undertaken by the firm, on the abilities of the individual,
and on the search duration of both parties. The wage offer is
determined by the expected productivity of the applicant and is
conditional on his educational level. Higher abilites may lead to—27—
an overqualification of the individual with respect to the require-
ments of the job in question.
(v) The crucial step is to link several (unobserved) variables of the
model to usually observed variables. Although some attempts are
described no claim is made that available data are a satisfactory
substitute for the variables in question.—28—
Footnotes
1For possiblecauses of youth unemployment (in the U.S.) see R. FREEMAN
(1979) and (in the Federal Republic of Germany) W. FRANZ (1979).
2For more detailssee K. V. BURY (1975) and D.R. COX (1962), for example.
3See C. CHAMBERLAIN(1979), D. R. COX (1962).
4See K. V. BURY(1975, p. 489).
A
5 . xx x =—() . exp{—(—)}
6Xlimplies fw'a,Al)=exp{—}fEXx;)
and FEx(x,a) =1—exp{—}
Inthe case X=l the WEIBULL—model coincides with thegamma—model. The
main difference between the WEIBULL— and the gamma—model isthat the WEIBULL
hazard function approaches zero as x*aifA<1 whereas thegamma hazard
function approaches an asymptote value)O. See G. CHAMBERLAIN(1979, p.33).
7K. V. BURY (1975,p.500).
8For an extensive discussionof the log—normal distribution see J. AITCHISON
and J. A. C. BROWN (1957).
9See G. S. WATSON andW. T. WELLS (1961). The higher the value of a the
earlier the maximum of the hazard function withrespect to time.
'0This is similarto the procedure of L. S. LEIGHTON and J. MINCER (1979,p.35)
who consider the probability of finding a job offerand the probability of finding
an acceptable job conditional on finding avacancy.
In the model ofJ. J. SEATER (1979, 1977) where a week is theunderlying time
period T equals 168 hours. A discussion about how much recreationtime an
individual needs at the minimum is beyond thescope of this paper and is left
to the reader.—29--
22Admay or may not coincide with the first moment of the distribution.
23See M. SPENCE (1976).
24SeeN.SPENCE (1973). ttSignals" are subject to manipulation by the individual,
whereas"indices" are attributes generally thought not to be alterable (sex,
for example). The uncertainty may be reduced by a time of probation with a very
shortperiod of notice.
25See N. SPENCE (1973) p.352).
26
The. expected return from screening one more applicant is the probability of being
qualified multiplied by the difference between the marginal product of a worker
correctly predicted to be qualified and his wage. In equilibrium this return
must equal the marginal cost of screening.
See C.J.BORJAS and N. S. GOLDBERG (1978, p.919).
27These minimum abilitiesmay, of course, change over time. There is some
evidence that employers had raised this minimum level for some jobs during
the last recession.
28The details are reported in theempirical part. In order to give an impression now
what we have in mind suppose n=2. Let category 1 include all jobs which
require abilities measured by a level of school education below high school
education (i.e., below "Nittlere Reife" or "Fachschule"). The minimum level
is assumed to be vocational training or at least some training on the job and
work experience for this category. With respect to category 2, minimum require-
ments are difficult to explore. Lack of data prohibits us from taking more into
account than work experience.
the empirical section it turns out that DA is a dummy with flAl if the
minimum requirements are met and DA=O otherwise.-3c1-
They include separable, complete,reflective, transitive, Continuous and
strongly monotonic preferences and that urnU ='' lim
c÷o
urn U 0, urn —':, U =U =0
L+S-OL+S L+S=T C,L+SL+S,C
'3We neglect thecase L =
Lt+1=0fQr a youth satisfactorily supported by his
parents since it gives no substantial additional information.
14Seee.g. M. H. DE GROOT (1970), and H. RAIFFA (1970). denotes a
decision fork and 0achance fork. See H. RAIFFA (1970), p.11.
15
. Weassume that his economic situation will be very bad if he failsto
get a job and did not work in the first period.lIe may he on a very poor
welfare program or receive somemoney from his parents, for example.
16Toø shorta time period, however, may be in conflict with therequirement that
the individual must have worked in thepresent time period in order to be
entitled to unemployment compensation.
'7Seee.g. H. G. GRUBEL and D. XI (1976), H. KONIG and N. FRANZ(1978), and
B. T. NORTENSEN (1970).
'8For a similarresult see D. T. NORTENSEN (1977).
19 — Forsimplicity assume that L is high enough to make itimpossible for the
individual to hold two differentjobs.
20Remember thecaveat in the introductory chapter. We do not discusshiring
in general. This may be due to replacementdemand or additional demand because
of a higher (expected) level of demand forthe firm's products.
21Anotherpossibility in this case would be that the firm lowersthe level of
these minimum requirements.Note, however, that the firm may run intodifficulties,
then. First, the job requirementsmay be statutory (example: medical service).
Second, other persons holding a similarjob within the firm may object to the
lowering standards because it might later reflecton their own qualifications.—31—
30
Neither a minimum nor a maximumnor a desired level of required skillsis
reported. If only one of these were
available, one might assume a variance
of skills allowed by the firmand calculate an approximaterange of skills
for each category of vacanciesand the percentage ofunemployed persons
falling into this range. Thispercentage would be a better proxy for theproba—
bility to get a job offer.
31Not allvacancies are announced to the laboroffice, and experience indicates
that the appropriateness of theunemployed the labor office presents to the
firms may be seriouslyquestioned in some cases.—32--
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